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BRIDGING THE "REPRESENTATION GAP"
Matthew W. Finkint
I don't think we need more lawsuits in America. And I don't
think we need more.., labor unions in America.'
It's a hell of a lot easier to get $100,000 [for a plaintiff employee]
than to get five cents an hour for blue-collar workers.2
What Workers Wan? tells us a great deal, but just what it tells us will
be much discussed: social survey research is notoriously "soft"; criticism of
the research design or its execution is inevitable; and the data may be
variously interpreted despite the obvious care Freeman and Rogers have
taken even to explore the effect of changed wording and question sequence
on the responses. In what may be their most controversial finding, for
example, Freeman and Rogers conclude that a majority of workers favor a
"cooperative" form of representation, one in which employees lack
"power" but have "influence." This finding perplexes because, from what
appears, the survey did not explain the distinction between "power" and
"influence" to its respondents, nor is the distinction obvious. The
respondents did indicate that having "influence" meant that they were
listened to and taken seriously, that their views actually affected
management decision-making in certain areas of importance. But this only
confounds the distinction: What is "power" if not the capacity to influence
another's decisions better to comport with one's wishes?4
t Albert J. Harno Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A.,
1963, Ohio Wesleyan University; LL.B., 1967, New York University; LL.M., 1973, Yale
University. These remarks have benefited from critical comments by Clyde Summers who,
it must be said, is skeptical (to say the least) of the "soft law" suggestion broached at the
close of these remarks.
1. Robert Pear, Elated by Antitrust Triumph, Doctors Take Case to Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2000, at Al (quoting Trent Lott, U.S. Senate Majority Leader).
2. WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 237 (1997) (quoting Judith Vladeck, Esq.).
3. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999).
4. Cf. Patricia Greenfield & Robert Pleasure, Representatives of Their Own Choosing:
Finding Workers' Voice in the Legitimacy and Power of Their Unions, in EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FuTuRE DIRECTIONS 169, 178-180 (Bruce Kaufman
& Morris Kleiner eds., 1993) ("Power is often described as 'the ability to bring about
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Nevertheless, at an irreducible minimum, the study tells us that a great
many American employees feel a need for representation vis-h-vis their
employers, that their need is not being filled, and that the reason for the gap
between demand and supply can be attributed to American management's
unwillingness to relinquish authority or to share power.5 This conclusion is
beyond cavil; and, it speaks volumes as to whether the representation gap
can be filled and how the law might fill it.
I. THE LAW AS OBSTACLE
Some see the paramount obstacle to giving workers the kind of
representation they want to lie in the Labor Act's allegedly anachronistic
and inflexible prohibition of company domination of "labor organizations",
which are broadly defined to include any representation plan in which
employees participate and which exists to deal with management over
conditions of work.6 Note, for example, Michael LeRoy's characterization
of the Act's "severity" in this regard:
An employer wants to try to accommodate working parents by
allowing more flexible scheduling. However, the employer does
not know which employees want a more flexible schedule or how
to make a series of flexible schedules fit the organization's daily
work requirements. A committee of employees and managers is
formed and charged to discuss the matter with coworkers and
develop a new scheduling plan. The committee eventually
produces a plan that the employer considers and implements with
some modifications.7
This course of conduct, LeRoy concludes, violates the law8 and so
deters employers from meeting the very need that Freeman and Rogers
document.
outcomes you desire' .... There is a debate as to whether to distinguish power, persuasion,
authority, influence and control.") (citations omitted).
5. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 144. This accords with Freeman and Lazear's
earlier theoretical exposition leading to their conclusion that "management, on its own, will
either fail to institute socially productive councils [systems of employee participation] or
give them less power than is socially desirable." Richard Freeman & Edward Lazear, An
Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in WORKS COUNcILS 25, 31 (Joel Rogers &
Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1995).
7. Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: Redefining a
Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1651, 1657
(1999) (emphasis added).
8. Id. ("The flex-scheduling committee is a section 2(5) labor organization because
employees participated in it and they dealt with their employer over a condition of work.
Since the employer formed the committee and determined its composition, it was dominated
for purposes of section 8(a)(2).") (citations omitted).
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There are three reasons to be skeptical about this claim grounded in
law, in experience, and in the fit between what would be offered and what
is sought. First, note the use of the passive voice in LeRoy's hypothetical:
a committee "is formed." Only in the next paragraph does the reader learn
that the employer formed the committee. The committee then "produced"
a plan, but the reader is not told how. If management selected the
employee participants (perhaps from a group of volunteers), scheduled the
meetings, chaired (or "facilitated") the discussions, decided what was in
and out of bounds for committee consideration, and modified the
employees' proposals for its own adoption, then it would indeed have
committed an unfair labor practice.9 The question is why management
would have insisted on structuring the process that way. To be sure,
management was faced with a problem: how best to accommodate working
parents and those without children (who might resent having a less
desirable schedule thrust upon them), while still getting its work done. If
management needed to understand employee sentiment, it was free to
survey employees without violating the law.'0 If management really did
not care what the schedule was as long as the work was done and most of
the employees were satisfied, it could have asked the work group to solve
the problem independently." And if the employer felt the need to engage
with employees in devising a schedule, it could simply have summoned
them-personally or by e-mail-and said: "I need to work out a schedule.
Send me your representatives and I will deal with them." Absent more, no
unfair labor practice will have been committed, for nothing in the law
prohibits an employer from initiating a labor organization. 2 And, as long
9. See Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1999).
10. Michael C. Harper, The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the
Contemporary Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2322, 2326 (1998).
11. General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). Bruce Kaufman explored this
option in his interviews with several managements involved in employee participation
programs. Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and
Participation Programs in Nonunion Companies?: A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 729 (1999). He observes:
From a management perspective, this approach both satisfies the law and
increases the credibility and legitimacy of the decisions made by the employee
representational committee [or work group], but it also opens up the possibility
that a committee's [or group's] decisions may substantially change company
employment policy (an "unholy precedent") or contravene employment law.
Id. at 775. The latter reason is unpersuasive. There would be few consequences to the
company were it to decline to enforce or to rescind an action the group had taken that was
unlawful; and there would be scant impact on the morale of the work group once the legal
grounds were adequately explained. The former and more persuasive reason begs the
question: whom does the policy vex, for whom is the precedent "unholy"? Not the work
group that produced it. This is the crux of management's concern: by delegating decisional
authority to the work group, management would lose control.
12. Note, Participation With Representation: Ensuring Workers' Rights in Cooperative
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as the employer exercises no control over the employees' committee-as
long as the employees are free to select their representatives and to
establish their own structure and procedures--the employer will not have
impermissibly dominated it.13  Management does not routinely secure
employee representation this way, but not because the law prohibits it.'
4
The second reason to be skeptical is experiential. Michael LeRoy's
empirical research suggests that the law has actually had scant effect on
management's ability to create "employee involvement" systems.' 5  It
seems that employers are largely indifferent to section 8(a)(2). Bruce
Kaufman disagrees. On the basis of interviews with managers at nine
companies, four management labor lawyers and two management
consultants, several of whom were indifferent to the law because of the
extreme unlikelihood of being charged with a violation and the "modest"
penalty involved, 16 Kaufman concludes that companies would do more in
the nature of employee involvement but for the law. 17 This proposition
cannot be disproved;"8 but, it is counter-experiential.' 9
Management, 1994 ILL. L. REV. 729, 737-738.
13. Whether or not management will have impermissibly "supported" the labor
organization financially or otherwise under section 8(a)(2) is a separate matter. The Board
has long distinguished permissible cooperation with a labor organization from
impermissible support; and were the employee group to be truly independent, there should
be no reason why that distinction would not apply. See ROBERT GORMAN, LABOR LAW ch.
IX § 6 (1976).
14. Around 1919, Charles Schwab of Bethlehem Steel said of that company's employee
representation plan, "We discuss matters, but we never vote .... I will not permit myself to
be in a position of having labor dictate to management." DAVID BRODY, LABOR IN CRISIS:
THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1919 86 (1987); cf Ann G. Leibowitz, The "Non-Union" Union?, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE N.Y.U. 50TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 235 (Samuel Estreicher
ed., 1999) [hereinafter CONFERENCE] (providing an account, as labor counsel to Polaroid, of
the events leading up to the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(2) violation in Polaroid Corp.,
329 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1999)). One cannot but be struck, in both Leibowitz's account and
the Board's decision, by the extraordinary length to which Polaroid went to try to avoid a
formal vote on proposals by the employee group.
15. Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Involvement Programs and Section 8(a)(2): A Survey
of Employer Practices, in CONFERENCE, supra note 14, at 141; cf. Mark Barenberg,
Commentary on LeRoy, Employment Involvement Programs, in CONFERENCE, supra note
14, at 177 (challenging the use of empirical data and concluding that this case law has not
had the extreme effect predicted by employers and unions); James Rundle, The Debate Over
the Ban on Employer-Dominated Labor Organizations: What is the Evidence?, in
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 161 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds.,
1994).
16. Kaufman, supra note 11, at 777.
17. Id. at 778-79.
18. See Laura W. Stein, What Can "Non-Unions" Do?: A Response to Ms. Leibowitz
and Professor Hyde, in CONFERENCE, supra note 14, at 267.
19. Kaufman argues that "[m]ost companies understandably want to avoid both the
large financial costs and public embarrassment associated with litigation." Kaufman, supra
note 11, at 777. Kaufman's argument is supportable if company domination of a labor
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Third, the Act's deterrent effect, such as there may be one, raises the
question of whether it deters employers from instituting not the kind of
employee representation employers want, but the kind of representation
employees want. It may be that management should be free to structure
and direct work groups that consider working conditions as well as
productivity even when, as Michael Harper has observed, managers have
formed such bodies "to align them with management priorities, to create a
distorted impression of employee influence, and to extract information
about efficient production that it may not be in the self-interest of
employees to provide-at least in the absence of the protection of
independent representatives." 20  Le., one may think the law ought not
attempt to blunt such efforts, but that has little to do with filling the
representation gap as perceived by employees. According to Freeman and
Rogers, employees want their representatives to be independent of
management (and so they would prefer to elect them); they want their
representatives to have the ability to raise any matter of interest; and they
want their representatives to agree jointly with management in certain
critical matters, failing which they want their representatives to be able to
address these differences through an outside neutral agency rather than to
leave it to unilateral managerial action. None of these elements run afoul
of section 8(a)(2); indeed, they are bolstered by it. But as Freeman and
21Rogers show, this tends not to be what management has in mind.
II. REFASHIONING FEDERAL LAW
Virtually every commentator has conceded that the search for
alternative forms of representation is stimulated, even if only in part, by the
weaknesses of the National Labor Relations Act.22 It is equally recognized
organization always has that effect; but, it does not. The only "risk" an employer runs by
falling afoul of section 8(a)(2) is of quietly settling the case with the NLRB regional office's
agent (merely by disestablishing the organization) upon complaint (most likely only when a
union comes on the scene to organize) without any compensation, because no one is
involved, or without a murmur in the press, because the public does not care.
20. Michael C. Harper, A Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor
Movement, 76 IND. L.J. 103, 114 (2001) (citing Mark Barenberg, Democracy and
Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible
Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 825-78 (1994)).
21. Indeed, a major argument for abrogating section 8(a)(2) is the possibility that, as in
the 1940s, these new "company unions" might evolve into truly independent (and effective)
employee representatives. See, e.g., Sanford Jacoby, Current Prospects for Employee
Representation in the U.S.: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 16 J. LAB. RES. 387, 389-91 (1995)
(recommending an experimental relaxation of current law proscribing employer assistance
to labor organizations to improve the quality of the representation).
22. See, e.g., Michael Gottesman, Collective Employee Representation in the 21st
Century, paper presented at Symposium on The Changing Workplace in the New
2001]
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that there is no political prospect of strengthening that law, for example, by
adding significant penalties for the discharge of union supporters or
providing for the arbitration of initial collective bargaining agreements.
Consequently, a question inherent in What Workers Want is whether a
rather different law could be fashioned: one that would accommodate what
workers perceive as an alternative to collective bargaining-that is, a
"cooperative" system of representation that eschews "power" for
"influence." Because much recent writing has looked to foreign experience
to inform our thinking (Paul Weiler and Charles Craver have argued that
European works councils are worthy of emulation here,24 Michael LeRoy
and Bruce Kaufman have pointed to the absence of section 8(a)(2)
analogues in Canadian law in support of its modification, 2 and Ellen
Dannin has challenged the alternative of "value-added unionism 2 6 by
reference to New Zealand's experience with it27), I have turned to a long-
neglected foreign model. The model is from an industrial country, and
would seem to fit the values and assumptions of American management
better than some of the more commonly touted schemes, while providing
special insight into our current situation.
We are called upon to reconcile the tension between two potentially
conflicting demands. First, management must be assured that its
fundamental prerogatives will not be compromised, and that the function of
any employee representative body will be only advisory. Second,
employees must be assured that, even though they lack power to compel
accession to their views, their advice will be solicited and taken
seriously-that they can have an effective voice, at least as best as legal
Millennium, sponsored by the Columbia Business Law Review, Columbia Law School,
March 18, 2000. Leo Troy argues that it is "[c]ompetitive forces, including structural
change," not weakness in the law that has resulted in union decline. Leo Troy, Commentary
on Freeman & Rogers, What Do Workers Want?, in CONFERENCE, supra note 14, at 33, 38.
Most other commentators agree that these factors explain a good deal of union decline, but
they are not as dismissive of the law's inadequacy. See Julius G. Getman, Explaining the
Fall of the Labor Movement, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 575 (1997).
23. Indeed, Kaufman's argument for loosening section 8(a)(2) is conditioned on a
strengthening of the Labor Act so that the two forms of representation-company-sponsored
and external-would compete on a level playing field. Kaufman, supra note 11, at 775.
24. PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990); Charles Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is Required in
a Declining Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful Industrial
Democracy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135, 146 (1997).
25. LeRoy, supra note 7, at 1670-88; Kaufman, supra note 11, at 803-08.
26. See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up
the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1996) (proposing an
emerging model of "value-added unionism" as a conception that suggests that unions also
present a "voice face" to workers and the firm).
27. Ellen J. Dannin, Cooperation, Conflict, or Coercion: Using Empirical Evidence to
Assess Labor-Management Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 873, 883 (1998).
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machinery can assure it. The bridge between the two would have to rest
upon the creation of a shared sense of community, of mutual trust and
obligation.
Let us first address management's concern. Our model law provides
at the very outset: "The employer is the leader of the enterprise [and] the
employees are supporters ['followers' would be a better translation, but it
sounds a bit demeaning and antiquated] who work together with the
leadership to further the aims of the enterprise and for the common
benefit." The statute then vests in management the express power to make
policy and determine working conditions subject, however, to a duty of
care for the well being of the workforce which, in turn, owes a statutory
duty of loyalty to the leadership.
Two aspects of this provision would only restate existing American
law. Management has the pre-existing right to make rules and determine
working conditions and employees labor under a common law "duty of
loyalty" to the enterprise.28 What this provision injects is the idea of
management performing a leadership role29 in which it owes a statutory
duty of care to the workforce. There is much in the recent corporate
governance literature on whether or not employees ought be treated legally
as "stakeholders" of the enterprise. 0 This provision adopts that view. It
recognizes that workers have a legitimate claim on management. Although
they are not equal partners (another aspect of existing law31), they are
participants in the enterprise and management must have due regard for
employee interests.
Having assured management of its proper role by law, the statute
attends to replacing "the mistrust that characterizes many traditional factory
settings with the mutual trust and confidence" that observers have found to
characterize the modem "high performance" workplace.32  Indeed,
28. See generally, Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in
the United States, 20 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 322 (1999) (discussing an employee's
duty of loyalty to the enterprise).
29. There is much in the literature of the "high performance" workplace on the role of
modem management as "leadership." See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
CHANGING NATURE OF WORK 136-37 (1999).
30. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 287 (1999) (considering the theory that employees
should be treated as stakeholders); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 899, 954 (1993) (proposing to reform the legal model of the corporation to
recognize employees' stake in the firm).
31. See, e.g., First Nat'l. Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981) (explaining
that Congress, in establishing the process of collective bargaining under the National Labor
Relations Act, "had no expectation that the elected union representative would become an
equal partner in the running of the business").
32. EILEEN APPELBAUM ET AL., MANUFACTURING ADVANTAGE: WHY HIGH-
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proponents of the abandonment of section 8(a)(2) argue that they seek "to
build a stronger and stronger bond between employers and employees, a
bond of mutual trust. 33 Accordingly, our model law next provides for the
establishment of an elected employee representative body to act in an
"advisory capacity." Given the statutory purpose, it is called a "Council of
Trust." The Council is charged with the statutory duty of increasing
"mutual confidence" in the plant community. It is authorized:
to discuss all measures concerning the improvement of output,
the form and enforcement of the general conditions of labor
especially the plant regulations, the enforcement and
improvement of safety measures, the strengthening of the ties
between the members of the plant themselves and their ties with
the plant, as well as the welfare of all members of the
community. Furthermore, it is their task to resolve all disputes
within the plant community. Their views must also be heard
before any decision on punishment for the violation of the plant
rules.
The law also creates a public office, the Trustee of Labor, for the
administration of the Act to oversee the electoral process and the proper
functioning of the system. The plant leader chairs the Council, but a
majority of Councillors could call it into session. Management is
statutorily obligated to provide the Council with all information necessary
for it to perform its statutory functions. And when a Council of Trust
believes a managerial decision is "incompatible with the economic or
social conditions in the plant," for example, in the content of a plant rule
adopted by management over the Council's very strong objection, it has the
right, by majority vote, to appeal such a decision to the Trustee of Labor
who is charged with resolving such disputes.
In terms of housekeeping, the law specifies the number of Councillors
depending on the size of the plant, their terms of office, and electoral
procedure. Because the whole purpose of the system is to develop mutual
confidence, the electoral list of Council nominees has to be vetted with the
plant leadership to assure management that the Councillors elected by the
workforce are persons with whom management can cooperate. In other
words, there would have to be a degree of give-and-take in the nominating
process to assure that both employees and management shared confidence
in the Council. In the current American context, this works a fair
compromise between employees, a majority of whom prefer election, and
managers, a narrow majority of whom oppose election. 4 Even in a
PERFORMANCE WORK SYSTEMS PAY OFF 8 (2000).
33. Testimony of Vicki J. McCormick, Human Resources Manager, EFCO Corp.,
before the House Economic and Educational Opportunities Committee (May 11, 1995).
34. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 142.
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unionized setting, management may refuse to deal with a union
representative where the particular individual would create ill will and
make good faith bargaining impossible,35 and the element of mutual
confidence is, if anything, more important in the "cooperative" system the
statute is intended to create.
Although the foregoing is fairly faithful in structure and even in literal
text to the model from which it was fashioned, there are some omissions
and losses in translation. For example, the "plant leader" of the original
was not understood in the contemporary jargon of the high performance
workplace, but carried a strong military connotation. Similarly, the
discussion has omitted the role of overseer (Obmann) of the plant
organization of the National Socialist party in vetting the list of electoral
nominees and the requirement that members of the Council of Trust
(Vertrauensrat) be members of the party, the model for our hypothetical
statute being the Law for the Organization of National Work (Gesetz zur
Ordnung der nationalen Arbeit) ("AOG") of 1934.36
I have turned to the AOG because the National Socialist regime also
sought the means to provide employees with representation and it, too, was
presented with inconsistent and potentially conflicting concerns.37 Before
the Nazi seizure of political power, the employer's power over the
workplace had been legally constrained by four sources: positive law; the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated with the union; the plant
agreement negotiated with the independent works council established by
law during the Weimar Republic; and individual contract. By 1934, the
regime had eliminated the trade unions and was faced with developing an
alternative industrial relations policy. The AOG sought to supplant
contractualism, with its subtext of individual rights, with an intense (and
politically correct) communitarianism: 31 the workplace was to be a
35. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons Mfg. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 375 (1980) af'd, 670 F.2d 663 (6th
Cir. 1982); KDEN Broad. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 25 (1976).
36. The original text can be found in the Reichsgesetzblatt, January 23, 1934, at 45-56.
A translation of some provisions and a synopsis is supplied in Document 227, in NAZIsM
1919-1945: STATE, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1933-1939 339-43 (J. Noakes & G. Pridham
eds., 1984), and I have relied heavily, but not exclusively on the translation in the above.
The law designated the employer as the "leader of the plant" (Fiihrer des Betriebs), and
white and blue collar workers as "retinue" of the leader (Gefolgschaft), in a harkening back
to the medieval military band.
37. The best sources in English on the AOG are TIM MASON, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
THIRD REICH (Joan Broadwin trans., Jane Caplan ed., 1993) [hereinafter MASON, SOCIAL
POLICY] and Tim Mason, The Origins of the Law on Organization of National Labor of 20
January 1934. An Investigation into the Relationship Between 'Archaic' and 'Modem'
Elements in Recent Gennan History [hereinafter Mason, Origins of the AOG], in TIM
MASON, NAZISM, FASCISM AND THE WORKING CLASS 77 (Jane Caplan ed., 1995).
38. The principal draftsman of the AOG and its animating spirit was Dr. Werner
Mansfeld. Mansfeld was born in 1893. He fought in World War I as a front line officer.
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community (Betriebsgemeinschaft), headed by a leader (Fiihrer) to whom
loyalty was owed but who, in return, had a publicly accountable duty to
care for the welfare of the workforce. The Vertrauensrat was conceived
of, not as a representative of the "special interests" of workers like the
works council of Weimar law, but as an "organ of the company."40 It was
an effort, stimulated by the most advanced thought in industrial
psychology,4 to "'grasp the worker as a whole person and reincorporate
him as such in the organism of the plant.' ''42 In so doing, it would also
restore the employer to his traditional role of "master in his own house"
(Herr im Hause).43  German workers failed to be beguiled. About sixty
After the war ended, he joined the Freikorps taking part in the Kapp Putsch. He had studied
law at the University of Miinster in 1930, and later served there as a lecturer; in other words,
he was a man of some academic accomplishment. As a lawyer, he represented the
Association of Mining Interests in Essen. From this he developed a specialty in labor
relations. He joined the Nazi party only when called to the Ministry of Labor as a
Ministerial Director and Leader of Department III for Labor Law. As Wolfgang Spohn puts
it, Mansfeld was not an absolute (unbedingt) Nazi, but rather "a reactionary to the bone
[reaktionar bis auf die Knochen] and thoroughly unscrupulous." WOLFGANG SPOHN,
BETRIEBSGEMEINSCHAFT UND VOLKSGEMEINSCHAFT: DIE RECHTLICHE UND INSTITUTIONELLE
REGELUNG DER ARBEITSBEZIEHUNGEN IM NS-STAAT 13 (1987) (reviewing Mansfeld's
biography and role). Mansfeld is further discussed in ANDREAS KRANIG, LOCKUNG UND
ZWANG: ZUR ARBEITSVERFASSUNG IM DRTrEN REICH 37-38 (1983). In 1941, Mansfeld
wrote a commentary on the AOG in which he said, in pertinent part:
Individual labour contracts had hitherto been understood in materialist terms
and established only a contractual relation between 'employer' and 'workforce'.
This has been replaced by the 'loyalty relationship' [Treueveriiltnis] between
leader and followers which is the foundation of their common activity, and has
(along with the employer's welfare responsibilities) to a large extent become the
juridical foundation of the rights and duties that derive from labour relations.
Of course, the contract remains indispensable as the basis for labour relations,
and certain material details must be regulated by it. But the contractual
relationship with mutual and interdependent rights and duties has been
eliminated from the relationship between the entrepreneur and his followers.
Mason, Origins of the AOG, supra note 35, at 98-99; see also, Bernd Rithers, Die Ideologie
des Nationalsozialismus in der Entwicklung des deutschen Rechts von 1933 bis 1945, in
RECHT UND RECHTSLEHRE IM NATIONALSozIALISMus 17 (Franz Jtirgen Slicher ed., 1992).
39. I have omitted discussion of the AOG's creation of "courts of social honor" to
regulate abuse of workplace authority by managers and supervisors. See KRANIG, supra
note 38, at 232-40. It was an exercise in cynicism. Id. However, the employer's duty of
care for the welfare of the workforce (Fiirsorgepflicht) has continued as a significant
element of German labor law today.
40. SPOHN, supra note 38, at 68.
41. MASON, SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 37, at 106.
42. Mason, Origins of the AOG, supra note 37, at 91 (citation omitted). See, e.g., Hans
Nipperdey, Die Pflict des Gefoigmannes zur Arbeitsleistung, DEUTSCHES ARBEITSRECHT 186
(1938).
43. BERNARD BELLON, MERCEDES IN PEACE AND WAR 223 (1990) (discussing the effort
to implement the AOG at Mercedes). Although the AOG provided that, "[iun order for the
Councillors of Trust to perform their function, the leader of the plant is obligated to supply
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percent of those workers eligible to vote for Councillors of Trust stayed
away from the polls in 1934. The 1935 election was so rigged by the
regime as to totally discredit the result. The next election was canceled.
Elections never were held again. Council members were simply appointed
jointly by the employer, the overseer of the party cell organization and the
Trustee of Labor.44
This rebarbative historical digression is intended to illuminate the
context in which we take up industrial relations-or human resource
management4--as a matter of public policy today. The United States also
faces a gap in representation; we, too, are told that means should be found
to fill it by creating a "cooperative" form of workplace governance, and
that this earlier German model would seem ready-made to supply what
American workers want. The comparison takes us to the legal and social
landscape on which the model would be rooted: in Germany, of a then
recent history of independent worker representation bolstered by the law; in
America, of decades of decline in union density and a labor law that fails to
deter employers from engaging even in anti-union terrorism.
46
From this perspective, it is more than a little unnerving to realize that
a law drafted by a fascist regime to dissolve worker independence, to
persuade employees by modem techniques of industrial psychology to
think of themselves as integral members of a cooperative workplace
community, and to restore employer dominance, might actually be taken in
America today as an advance in securing employees some workplace
influence. In any event, it is inconceivable that this model would be
supported by American managers who are already masters in their own
house and perceive no need for the intervention of the state.
The raw political fact is that there is no prospect for change in the
federal law of employee representation. Section 8(a)(2) will not be
abrogated or modified, whether or not that is a good47 or a
necessary information." Under section 13(2), in practice, it was for the employer to decide
what information was "necessary." SPoHN, supra note 38, at 62. And though a majority of
the Council could appeal a plant leader's directive to the Trustee of Labor in the Reich
Ministry of Labor (the office created by the AOG to oversee the law), the leader's directive
remained in force pending a ruling and could be actionable against the Councillors if the
Trustee found the complaint to be unjustified. RICHARD GRUNBERGER, THE 12-YEAR REICH:
A SOCiALHISTORY OFNAZI GERMANY 1933-1945 193 (1995).
44. MASON, SOCIAL POLIcY, supra note 37, at 166, 177-78.
45. PRnLIP SELzNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 96 (1969) (stating that
"[i]n one sense, to think of a man as a 'human resource' is to affront his personality").
46. This characterization is Professor Gottesman's in Gottesman, supra note 22, at 2
(speaking of "the threshold of terror that employees must hurdle"-of threats and summary
discharge-to secure collective representation). Gottesman's characterization is not
unwarranted.
47. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv.
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bad48 idea, because organized labor (with whatever political influence it can
muster) sees nothing in it; and, more adventurous schemes for indigenous
representation, for example, by genuinely independent works councils (or
the outri idea of non-majority representation49) have no future, for
employers see nothing in it for them. Consequently, attention must be paid
to the area of action left within the existing confines of federal law.
III. THE RESORT TO LAW
Almost fifty years ago, V.L. Allen contended that "[t]he end of trade-
union activity is to protect and improve the general living standards of its
members and not to provide workers with an exercise in self-
government."50  By these lights, unions are service-providers pure and
simple. Others see unions as critical social institutions from which we
learn and practice collective self-rule that is essential to the maintenance of
political democracy, as "seedbeds" 51 of a civic engagement that seem to be
in a general societal retreat.52 The two conceptions, however, are not
125, 126 (1994) (making the case for the partial repeal of Section 8(a)(2)).
48. See Robert B. Moberly, The Worker Participation Conundrum: Does Prohibiting
Employer Assisted Labor Organizations Prevent Labor-Management Cooperation?, 69
WASH. L. REV. 331, 331 (1994) (arguing that proposals to amend or repeal section 8(a)(2)
would lead to schemes that would threaten employee rights, evade unionization, and
seriously damage the credibility of legitimate worker participation programs).
49. Non-majority representation was supported by American business when the Labor
Act was proposed in lieu of exclusive representation by majority rule. Matthew Finkin, The
Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, in THE LEGAL
FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 191 (Matthew Finkin ed., 1994) [hereinafter
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION]. The idea has been scouted in Michael Gottesman, In
Despair, Starting Over: Imagining A Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, in EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION, supra, at 57, and in Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy,
21 J. LAB. RES. 247, 260 (2000), but it was given a more sympathetic consideration in Clyde
W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into a "Unique" American
Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 47 (1998), who fathered the inquiry. See generally
Clyde Summers, Unions Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHL.-KENT L. REv. 531
(1990).
50. V.L. ALLEN, POWER IN TRADE UNIONS: A STUDY OF THEIR ORGANIZATION IN GREAT
BRITAIN 15 (1954) (I am indebted to Sheldon Leader for bringing this reference to my
attention.). Allen's was a riposte to the claim that unless unions are run democratically, they
will be a threat, instead of a contributor, to political democracy. Samuel Estreicher has
criticized the very idea that a service provider, union or otherwise, should be democratically
governed. Estreicher, supra note 49, at 247-48.
51. E.g., Thomas Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic
Virtues, 36 B.C. L. REv. 279 (1995).
52. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REvIvAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 80-92 (2000) (noting a recent steep decline in union membership and a shift in
the workplace causing unions to serve as mere bargaining agents rather than leaders of
social movements).
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antagonistic.5 3
As many despair the loss of unions as institutions of self-rule, Michael
Gottesman has recently turned to their role as service-providers.5 4  He
points out that the decline of unions has been accompanied by the rise of
workplace law. Ironically, the laws often resulted from union lobbying.55
However, many of these laws are still inadequately implemented due to the
lack of legal counsel who are able and willing to undertake the necessary
litigation. He envisions the role of unions shifting from workplace
bargainers to legal service providers. 6 As Gottesman recognizes, there is
no inconsistency in unions including a more aggressive program with legal
services for dues-paying members to complement their role in workplace
representation; a social movement can do both.57
There are reasons to be sanguine about this prospect. First, there is
something to be said for the better realization in the workplace of what
society holds conditions ought to be, as a matter of law.
Second, it requires no change in law: group actions are frequently
brought over workplace disputes that implicate the legality of an
employer's policy or practice that affects a number of employees. 8 Class
actions brought under federal employment discrimination an d pension
protection laws, as well as other federal claims, commonly command a
good deal of press coverage. However, group actions are brought as well
under state employment law (both statutory and common law). State
claims may include: invasion of privacy,5 9
53. As Putnam points out, unions can be both service providers and arenas of civic
engagement, which makes these two functions "mutually reinforcing." Id. at 80.
54. Gottesman, supra note 49, at 57. He suggests in the latter that in this new
environment, characterized by individual legal entitlements, it is even possible for other
commercial organizations to market themselves more aggressively by packaging group legal
services.
55. Gottesman, supra note 22, at 12.
56. Id. at 9, 12-13. An earlier version of this argument was advanced by Robert Rabin.
Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 169,
172 (1991).
57. Gottesman, supra note 22, at 12-13. See also Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies
for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457,
538-39 (1992).
58. Gottesman pointed out in his remarks, supra note 22, that unions lack standing to
bring suits on behalf of their members under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1564 v. Albertson's, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193 (10th
Cir. 2000). This, he argued, calls for remedial legislation. The need for this reform seems
unassailable. Class actions are not allowed under the FLSA, only group actions brought by
multiple plaintiffs. A suit brought by a union in its own name would enable the union to
represent more efficiently the plaintiff group.
59. E.g., Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000); Vega-
Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 1997); Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d
914 (C.D. I91. 1999); Raines v. Shoney's, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Tenn. 1995);
Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
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defamation, 60 express or implied contract,6' breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing,62 violation of state wage payment or minimum wage
law,63 state wage and hour law,64 and discharge for a reason that violates
public policy, 65 to cite a few recent examples.
Third, a likely consequence would be actually to facilitate unions
functioning as minority (or "members only") representatives. Even in the
absence of mandated pre-trial mediation (required in some states and in
some federal districts66), it is inconceivable that most of these cases would
come to trial without a prior course of dealing between the parties looking
toward a resolution. Notice from the union as a litigant to the employer in
anticipation of legal action would most likely result in such a course of
dealing. In effect, the union would be bargaining with the employer on
behalf of the self-selected group in conjunction with its assertion of a legal
right.
Finally, according to Freeman and Rogers, although those workers
who have experienced the legal system tend to be dissatisfied with it,
workers want more law, or, at least, more legal protection.67 A more
aggressive union role in this regard would supply part of this demand.
We can only speculate, however, about the further consequences that
might flow from a more routine resort to law. The Dunlop Commission
was less than sanguine about the growth of litigation:
For every dollar paid to employees through litigation, at least
another dollar is paid to attorneys involved in handling both
meritorious and non-meritorious claims. Moreover, aside from
60. E.g., Freeman v. Bechtel Constr. Co., 87 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 1996); Davis v.
Copelan, 452 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Aranyosi v. Delchamps, Inc., 739 So. 2d 911
(La. Ct. App. 1999); Eskew v. Plantation Foods, Inc., 905 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
61. E.g., Demasse v. riT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999); Baldwin v. Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp., 3 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
62. E.g., Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marnaro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
63. E.g., Cork v. Applebee's of Mich., Inc., 608 N.W.2d 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000);
Boustany v. Monsanto Co., 6 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); Schneider v. Snyder's
Foods, Inc., 976 P.2d 134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
64. E.g., Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 995 P.2d 139 (Cal. 2000).
65. E.g., Minnesota Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 59 F.3d 80 (8th Cir.
1995); Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 87 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Babick v. Or. Arena Corp., 980 P.2d 1147 (Or. Ct. App.
1999); Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 888 P.2d 147 (Wash. 1995).
66. NANcY ROGERS & CRAIG MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRAcrIcE § 7.01 (2d
ed. 1994) ("Although parties to a dispute may ultimately refuse to settle in mediation, they
are not always free to decline participation. Increasingly, mediation of designated contested
issues is made mandatory by statute, court rule, or individual court ruling.") (footnote
omitted). I am indebted to my colleague, Ellen Deason, for bringing this and additional
references on this point to my attention.
67. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 127-32.
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the direct costs of litigation, employers often dedicate significant
sums to designing defensive personnel practices (with the help of
lawyers) to minimize their litigation exposure. These costs tend
to affect compensation: as the firm's employment law expenses
grow, less resources are available to provide wage and benefits to
workers.68
Because of these financial consequences, the Commission viewed the
rise in employment litigation as a "crisis" ' 69 which would only be
exacerbated by more litigation. Others, however, are skeptical of the
general claim of a litigation crisis rife in America.70
Conceding that at some level (and on some issues) the legal system
may create nothing more than a transfer of resources to lawyers, at another
level (and on other issues) it is a price we necessarily pay for civilization,
even if employees might pay for it with reduced wages. The latter, for
example, may well be the effect of workers' compensation systems, but no
one has argued seriously for the abandonment of those systems on that
ground.
Might there also be non-economic consequences of a heightened
resort to litigation? The extension of the influence of law into areas where
it was not all that active or visible heretofore not only "enlarge[s] and
deepen[s] the application of law, ' 72 it also means that the people subject to
it "more and more format their lives in accordance" with it.73  In the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, labor was subject to a process of
proletarianization, which unions sought to redress in the workplace. The
more aggressive resort to law in the twenty-first century holds the prospect
of a process of "juridification," 74 in which workplace decisions will be
subject to judicial scrutiny as long as a category of legal wrong can be
claimed and a client to assert it can be found.
Though the term has a slightly pejorative connotation, it is far from
68. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and
Recommendations, December 1994, at 25. The predicate for the conclusion would seem to
be off by a multiple, at least in wrongful discharge litigation, where for every dollar paid to
the employee, four dollars are paid to lawyers. Summers, supra note 57, at 469.
69. Id.
70. The leading skeptic is Marc S. Galanter. See Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the
Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell:
Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998). Some
of the empirical literature on point is collected in Kaufman, supra note 11, at 721-22.
71. John Addison & Barry Hirsch, The Economic Effects of Employment Regulations:
What Are the Limits?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
125, 138-41 (Bruce Kaufman ed., 1997).
72. JAN M. BROEKMAN, A PHILosoPHY OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 431 (1999).
73. Id. at 397-99.
74. See generally Spiros Simitis, The Juridification of Labor Relations, 7 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 93 (1985). The term in German is verrechtlichung. In French,juridicisme. Id. at 95.
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obvious that ajuridified workplace would necessarily be an evil. Employer
policies governing covenants not to compete, trade secrets, and use of
confidential business information currently require very close attention to
the law. No one has argued that this intensive legal involvement has had a
socially harmful effect. Indeed, it is far from obvious that we do or will
face an "intolerable" level of litigation.
The Dunlop Commission decried the "litigation leap"--an increase in
federal employment lawsuits of 430% from 1971 to 1991. 75 Freeman and
Rogers estimate that workers account for approximately 600,000 legal
76complaints to state and federal courts and to regulatory agencies per year.
Note that these figures are for a civilian workforce of well over
100,000,000.77 In the Federal Republic of Germany, which has a civilian
workforce that is one-third of this size, more than 700,000 claims are
brought to the labor courts alone every year.7 It is not at all clear that if the
United States were to resemble Germany more in this regard that it would
be worse off because of it.
The German comparison is complicated, however, by the presence
there, and absence here, of an indigenous system of works councils. These
statistics do not reflect all of the issues brought to and resolved by works
councils,79 but they do include cases brought to enforce co-determinational
or consultative rights before policies are adopted or managerial decisions
are made. There, juridification works in part to reinforce the role of the
workers' representatives in the workplace. Here, juridification would work
a transfer of power from human resource managers to lawyers; but, again,
it is not obvious that the shift of power on the company's side of the ledger
would be deleterious, or much noticed.
On the other side of the ledger, employees would get a form of
"members only" representation, which is unavailable to them under the
Labor Act. The problem is that the interests represented on the plaintiffs'
side may not invariably coincide with those of the larger workgroup not
represented in the litigation. Disputes, in particular, over private collective
goods-i.e. contractual claims concerning employer policies that cannot be
75. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report,
May 1994, at 112-13.
76. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 122.
77. Id.
78. Ginter Grotmann-H6fling, Die Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit im Lichte der Statistik, in 45
ARBErI UND RECHT 268, 272 (1997) (recording 714,865 claims); Giinter Grotmann-H6fling,
Die Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit 1998 im Lichte der Statistik, in 47 RECHT DER ARBErr 355, 339
(1999) (recording 741,003 claims).
79. In the matter of employee discharge, for example, the works councils endorse sixty-
six percent of termination decisions, are silent in twenty percent of them and register
opposition in only eight percent. Michael Kittner & Thomas Kohler, Kllndigungsschutz in
Deutchland und den USA, in 13 BrRMEns BERATER 1, 24 (Supp. 4, 2000). Only about ten
percent of all termination decisions are ever contested in the labor courts. Id. at 26.
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individually tailored, but must treat the workforce or components of it as a
group-may well implicate conflicts between represented and
unrepresented employees80 that litigation only awkwardly resolves.
In sum, juridification would work to hold employers more routinely
accountable to the law (at a possible cost of a reduction in wage levels),
work a shift of power away from managers to lawyers, and give some
employees a stronger voice vis-ii-vis their employers. On balance, this is
not an obviously evil set of trade-offs.
However, the "legal service" model of representation, which is geared
toward the vindication of established rights, is unsuited to the generation of
new private collective goods; that is, what unions do through collective
bargaining. Yet, as Freeman and Rogers show, workers want not only
more legal protection, but also more internal workplace participation.1 If
federal law is incapable of filling this want, and if unions as aggressive
legal service providers can supply only part of what workers want, is there
something, anything, that states can do?
IV. THE POTENTIAL OF STATE LAW
The potential for state law to bridge, even partially, the representation
gap must come to grips with the weltered world of federal labor law
preemption. 2 Earlier, it was commonly assumed that without collective
bargaining employees had rather little in the way of legally enforceable
protections or guarantees. As the foregoing has illuminated, however,
today collective bargaining is but one actor, not even in a major supporting
role, on a stage set with a host of protective federal and state labor
laws-aws dealing with occupational safety and health, job discrimination,
plant closing, wage payment, whistle-blowing, personnel files, pensions
and benefits, wages and hours, drug testing, and much more. The question
80. See, e.g., Cork v. Applebee's of Mich., Inc., 608 N.W.2d 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(concerning three restaurant servers complaints of "tip sharing" with bartenders and other
employees, who were not parties to the suit). This is the kind of dispute unions routinely
negotiate, in the resolution of which the complete satisfaction of each member of the group
cannot be assured. See, e.g., Hussein v. Sheraton N.Y. Hotel, 100 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206-209
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concerning a worker's claim of differential treatment and inadequate
union representation). It also cannot be assumed that in litigation, management's legal
position in defense of its policy or action-often to seek the most expansive judicial
recognition of an unfettered managerial prerogative--would coincide with the interests of
employees not represented in the litigation.
81. FREEMAN AND ROGERS, supra note 3, at 132.
82. Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv.
469 (1993); Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws
Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990); Eileen Silverstein, Against
Preemption in Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. Rv. 1 (1991).
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posed is whether the state has the ability to become one more actor on the
scene by, for example, mandating a works council or requiring an employer
to deal with "members only" organizations for those workforces that are
not represented by exclusive bargaining agents under federal law.
Such laws would confront two potential legal challenges. The first,
and more easily dealt with, is the part of preemption law that forbids the
states to require what federal law forbids. To the extent a state works
council law would require employers to violate section 8(a)(2), it would be
preempted.8' However, the law could avoid this pitfall by seeing to it that
the worker representatives are completely independent of employer
domination in the design and operation of the works council. In addition,
section 8(a)(2) would not pose any problem for requiring a "members only"
system.
The second and more difficult question is whether the Labor Act has
so "occupied the field" of employee representation as to preclude the states
from acting in these ways. As Justice Frankfurter observed in Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board,84 care needs be taken,
for the "[m]etaphor-'occupied the field'--has at times done service for
close analysis."85 In that case, New York applied its "Little Wagner Act"
to extend collective bargaining rights to the company's foremen, a result
that was concordant with the federal act, but which, at the time, the NLRB
would not have chosen to do. The majority charted out the field:
In the National Labor Relations Act, Congress has sought to
reach some aspects of the employer-employee relation .... It
has dealt with the subject or relationship but partially, and has
left outside of the scope of its delegation other closely related
matters. Where it leaves the employer-employee relation free of
regulation in some aspects, it implies that in such matters federal
policy is indifferent, and since it is indifferent to what the
individual of his own volition may do we can only assume it to
be equally indifferent to what he may do under the compulsion of
the state. 
6
81Nevertheless, the Court held the action to be preempted.
Two terms later, in La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board,8 s the Court glossed over the Bethlehem Steel
decision where a state labor board had applied state statutory criteria,
83. Cf. Op. of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., No. 10-CA-26718,
1993 WL 726790 (Sept. 21, 1993).
84. 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
85. Id. at 782.
86. Id. at 773.
87. Id. at 776.
88. 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
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determining appropriate bargaining units, that differed from those
contained in the NLRA. The jurisdiction of the NLRB had not been
invoked. Nevertheless,
Both the state and the federal statutes had laid hold of the same
relationship [in Bethlehem Steel] and had provided different
standards for its regulation. Since the employers in question
were subject to regulation by the National Board, we thought the
situation too fraught with potential conflict to permit the intrusion
of the state agency, even though the National Board had not acted
in the particular cases before us.89
... A certification by a state board under a different or
conflicting theory of representation may therefore be as readily
disruptive of the practice under the federal act as if the orders of
the two boards made a head-on collision. These are the very real
potentials of conflict which lead us to allow supremacy to the
federal scheme even though it has not yet been applied in any
formal way to this particular employer. The problem of
employee representation is a sensitive and delicate one in
industrial relations. The uncertainty as to which board is master
and how long it will remain such can be as disruptive of peace
between various industrial factions as actual competition between
two boards for supremacy.90
These are the Court's last definitive words; and, arguably, the Court
leaves the question presented here-whether, in the absence of an exclusive
bargaining relationship, the states may require an employer to deal with an
independent employee organization, either mandated by state law or
created voluntarily by employee designation-rather at sixes and sevens.
On the one hand, it can be argued that La Crosse Telephone forbids the
states from applying a "different or conflicting theory of representation"
than that set out in the NLRA.9' The Labor Act adopts a particular theory
of representation: by majority designation of an exclusive representative for
the wages, hours, and working conditions of members of an appropriate
bargaining unit. Congress considered and declined to adopt a members
only system; nor did Congress favor a works council approach, of
proportional representation, that it knew was likely to be one outcome of
that option.92 Were Congress to adopt either of these today, it would be
considered a fundamental change in federal labor policy; and so, the
argument would run, the states cannot apply a "theory of representation"
89. Id. at 25.
90. Id. at 26 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Finkin, supra note 49, at 195-96.
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that Congress refused to enact.93
Without denying the argument's obvious power, there remains
something to be said on the other hand: that the potential for the conflict of
laws contemplated by La Crosse Telephone is difficult to discern; that
inasmuch as employers may voluntarily deal with independent non-
majority representatives, the federal law should, in Bethlehem Steel's
terms, be "equally indifferent to what... [the employer] may do under
compulsion of the state" in that regard.94 Furthermore, there seems scant
reason to require employees who wish to be heard and to deal with their
employer over a particular issue of moment to them--and to which federal
law is substantively indifferent--to designate an exclusive bargaining agent
under federal law for all wages, hours, and working conditions in order to
do so.95
Freeman and Rogers tell us that workers have a fairly sophisticated
idea of which issues call for group action or assistance, and which issues
they would prefer to take up with their employers individually: "[t]hey
differentiate between those areas in which they prefer to deal with
problems by themselves and those in which the collective or public-goods
nature of the decision-health and safety, benefits, a system for resolving
problems-would seem to require a group input to be effective. 9 6 In other
words, a fair reading of the data suggests not that employees necessarily
want a single alternative organization to represent them; instead, employees
may well want discrete bodies capable of dealing with particular issues of
moment to them, while being assured that these bodies are independent of
the employer.
Accordingly, if the state cannot enact a "different theory of
representation," 97 governing employee participation in framing terms and
conditions of employment in general, could it do something less sweeping
to accommodate these more specific desires? The Court in Bethlehem Steel
recognized that the Labor Act deals with the employment relationship, "but
93. Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, added in 1947, authorizes the NLRB, by
agreement with state agencies, to cede jurisdiction for the regulation of labor relations in
certain businesses so long as the statute administered by the state is consistent with the
provisions of the Labor Act. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to require
that state law parallel federal law. Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wis. Employment Relations
Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 313 (1949). Section 10(a) of the act recognizes a role for the states to
regulate labor relations in enterprises over which the Board could assert jurisdiction, and so
weakens the claim of federal law to occupy the field. But the states would not be free under
this provision to apply a theory of representation other than one paralleling exclusive
representation by majority rule.
94. Bethlehem Steel, 330 U.S. at 773.
95. Finkin, supra note 49, at 212-13.
96. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 56.
97. La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18, 26 (1949).
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partially; '98 and the Court later admonished that "[t]he National Labor
Relations Act... leaves much to the states."99  An "appropriate
consideration for the vitality of our federal system and for a rational
allocation of functions belies any easy inference that Congress intended to
deprive the States of their ability to retain jurisdiction"' ° over a variety of
matters of concern in the employment relationship. A state may mandate
specific insurance benefits for employees'0 1 or severance pay in the event
of a plant closing, 102 even though these are mandatory bargaining subjects
to be negotiated with a union, if one is in place. The states are free to
impose "minimum terms of employment" and extend these to unionized, as
well as non-unionized, employees; and by "minimum," the Supreme Court
made plain that it meant non-waivable by individual employees and so non-
waivable by the union that represents them.10 3 In other words, the states are
free to reach those substantive aspects of the employment relationship that
are not reached, or reached only partially by the NLRA. Does this mean
that the states are totally precluded from attaching procedural requirements
for the better realization of these specific substantive rights by providing
for employee representation vis-a-vis employers instead of establishing
minimum terms of employment, because the "entire area' of employee
representation is "occupied" by federal law? Judicial interpretation of the
Labor Act may well contemplate a general bifurcation of state and federal
authority in labor relations,0 4 but an absolutely rigid wall of separation
between ends and means would be difficult to maintain. As we have seen,
class or group actions brought to vindicate a labor protective law or an
employer-generated collective good necessarily engenders a form of
members-only collective representation, albeit one geared to the
vindication of those specific legal claims. It could not seriously be
entertained that a state-mandated judicial mediation adjunct to such
litigation must be disallowed on preemption grounds because it necessarily
contemplates a different method of worker representation than that
98. Bethlehem Steel, 330 U.S. at 773.
99. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953) (citation omitted).
100. Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Int'l Union Local 54,468 U.S. 491, 503 (1984).
101. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,758 (1985).
102. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1987).
103. Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 754-55. Indeed a refusal to extend these benefits to
unionized employees would be preempted. Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994).
104. No provision of the Labor Act deals with preemption per se; it is a malleable, judge-
made doctrine. The Metropolitan Life Court observed that "[t]he NLRA is concerned
primarily with establishing an equitable process for determining terms and conditions of
employment, and not with particular substantive terms of the bargain that is struck when the
parties are negotiating from relatively equal positions." Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 753 (citing
Archibald Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J.
277, 297 (1980) (observing that "[t]he NLRA is primarily concerned with a method of
establishing terms and conditions of employment")).
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provided in the Labor Act. And if this is so, would it not be permissible for
the states either to require (a hard approach) or to encourage (a soft
approach) consultative processes with independent employee
representatives in non-unionized workplaces on questions concerning
specific public or private collective goods, even before litigation is
contemplated? We shall look at each of these in turn.
A. Hard Law
We need not speculate about the state's willingness to require more
narrowly focused forms of employee participation: at least eighteen states
mandate 05 or authorize °6 the creation of workplace safety committees in
105. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-15 (1992) (requiring the employer to appoint a safety
committee including at least one non-supervisory employee to "advise" on workplace
safety); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40v (1997) (establishing health and safety committees
pursuant to regulations issued by the Workers' Compensation Commission); FLA. STAT. ch.
442.012 (1999) (mandating an equal number of employee representatives under rules to be
adopted by the division of occupational safety and health); HAW. REv. STAT. § 386-k (2000)
(requiring an equal number of employee and employer representatives); MINN. STAT. §
182.676 (Supp. 2000) (stating that "[e]mployee safety committee members must be selected
by employees"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-1505(2)(a) (1999) (requiring committee to be
composed of employee and employer representatives) (MONT. ADMiN. R. 24.30.2542(3))
(1997) states that "[federal law prohibits domination of a safety committee by
management." Subsection (4)(a)(i) provides that employer representatives may not exceed
the number of employee representatives); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-443 (1998) (providing for
an equal number of employer and employee representatives; employees may not be selected
by the employer); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 618.383 (Michie 2000) (requiring workplace
safety committees); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:64 m11 (1999) (demanding an equal
number of employer and employee representatives and providing that employee
representatives be selected by employees) (N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. LAB. 603 (1999)
(implementing regulations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-252 (1999) (establishing that employer
representatives are not to exceed the number of employee representatives with employee
and employer representative co-chairpersons) (implementing regulations are set out at N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, r.7A.0604 (June 2000)); OR. REV. STAT. § 654.182 (1997) (requiring
an equal number of employee and employer representatives); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7.1-21
(1998) (authorizing the director to establish loss control standards that require a safety
committee); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-502 (1999) (mandating an equal number of employee
and employer representatives under rules to be prescribed; these are set out in considerable
detail in chapter 0800-2-3 of the Rules of the Tennessee Division of Workers'
Compensation); WASH. REv. CODE § 49.17.050 (Supp. 2000) (providing for rules
establishing safety and health plans) (WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-24-045 (1999) provides
accordingly for safety committees with employer representatives not to exceed employee
representatives, the committee to elect its chair); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2B-2 (Michie
1998) (authorizing the Commissioner of the Bureau of Employment to require a safety
committee; the rules require at least fifty percent employee representation, W. VA. CODE ST.
R. § 85-23-3 (2000)).
106. California permits employee safety committees to be provided for in employer-
generated injury prevention programs. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6401.7(0 (West 2000).
Pennsylvania provides for a discount on workers' compensation insurance premiums if
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conjunction with their workers' compensation or occupational safety and
health laws. Insofar as these apply to unionized workplaces, there is little
doubt that they are preempted as an impermissible intrusion into the
bargaining process: the state may not require that an employer circumvent
an exclusive bargaining agent by setting up a safety committee independent
of it, 0 7 nor may the state require a union to negotiate a specific provision.08
In the non-union workplace, these laws would be preempted to the extent
they would require an employer to violate section 8(a)(2).'09 But they need
not run afoul of section 8(a)(2): if they are established to assure the free
election by employees of their representatives, and if these representatives
have full freedom of action to propose, to consider, and to approve (or
reject) safety plans and rules in dealing with management, all of this
assured by state supervision, there would be no violation of section 8(a)(2).
There is no reason why such a narrowly crafted state law should be
preempted in the non-union workplace because the Labor Act has
"occupied the field" of employee representation. The Bethlehem Steel
Court made plain that even as the Labor Act dealt with the employment
relationship, it did so "but partially" and left "closely related matters" to the
states." '
The mandate of workplace safety committees fits within the compass
of state action thus allowed: these committees are procedural adjuncts to a
substantive end of assuring greater workplace safety,' a valid concern of
safety committees are operative. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1038.2 (West Supp. 2000). New
York authorizes the establishment of a Safety Trade Association Group which, in turn, may
appoint safety committees. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, App. D-1 (2000). Utah
recommends that injury prevention programs be established. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R614-1-5
(Supp. 2000).
107. Op. of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., No. 10-CA-26718,
1993 WL 726790 (Sept. 21, 1993).
108. Cannon v. Edgar, 33 F.3d 880, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1994). However, the states may
permit unions to "opt out" of minimum standards by collective agreements. Lividas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 131-32 (1999).
109. Op. of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., No. 10-CA-26718,
1993 WL 726790 (Sept. 21, 1993). The Connecticut law and implementing regulations
provide that non-management employees will "select" their members, that the number be at
least equal to the number of "employer members," and that the chair rotate between
employee and employer members as elected by the committee. The committee is given
statutory responsibility for "establishing procedures for sharing ideas with the employer"
concerning safety inspections, investigations, training, and prevention. The Attorney
General of Connecticut opined that these committees were not preempted because the rules
provided that they "shall not be construed to constitute a labor organization" under the
Labor Act. Op. Conn. Att'y Gen., No. 94-030, 1994 WL 873077 (Nov. 22, 1994).
Obviously, whether or not these committees are statutory labor organizations is not
determined by how the state has chosen to characterize them.
110. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,773 (1947).
111. See generally, Clyde Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs
in Labor Legislation, 31 BuFF. L. REV. 9, 27-29 (1982) (asserting the value of statutory
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the state that long antedates federal involvement. Nor is it obvious that
state-mandated safety committees so upset the system of collective
representation erected by the Act that they cannot be tolerated: the
committees do not bargain with the employer, rather they are bodies for
information-sharing and consultation whose work product, if successful,
will find its way not into collective agreements, but in employer policies
and procedures. It would be anomalous to say that the states may mandate
working conditions that unions acting under federal law cannot bargain
away, but may not extend to non-represented workers a means of better
realizing them.1 2 It would be equally anomalous to say that a group of
workers can sue for a safety violation and in that process require their
employer to deal with them over safety standards, and that workers can
deal at arms-length with their employer beforehand in setting up those
standards if he agrees to go along, but that the state is precluded from
requiring such a course of dealing as a way of improving standards and
avoiding litigation. And if this is so of safety, there is no reason why it
would not be equally so in other specific areas where workers may want to
have an independent voice."'
The serious hurdles to an expanded use of state-mandated employee
representation lie in implementation. As David Weil observed, "the notion
of requiring employers to institute employee participation in the formation,
approval, and/or administration of internal regulatory systems does not
ensure that activity in practice."' 14 The imponderables are not only in the
states' willingness to devote the resources and personnel necessary to
police such systems, but also in managements' willingness to cooperate
with them. 15 Were managers avid to establish independent employee
safety committees as a means of providing employees with a form of representation on key
matters of workplace safety).
112. There is general recognition that worker involvement in health and safety programs
can be a significant factor in assuring workplace safety. Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, Report and Recommendations, December 1994, at 55-58.
113. As Freeman and Rogers show, even as American workers may want more law, they
want workplace committees to enforce workplace standards even more. Eighty-five percent
thought this a "very good idea" or a "good idea." FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 138.
The overwhelming majority wanted employees to elect their committee members and
wanted the committee to be able to get advice from outside experts. Employees were,
however, roughly evenly divided over whether the committee's function should be advisory
or something more. Id. at 139.
114. David Weil, Implementing Employment Regulation: Insights on the Determinants of
Regulatory Performance, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
429, 464 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
115. From what appears, the likelihood of safety committees actually being established is
much greater at unionized workplaces than non-unionized workplaces. David Weil,
Mandating Safety and Health Committees: Lessons from the States, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
47TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE IRRA 273 (Paula Voos ed., 1995). This finding parallels the
pattern of implementation of the German works council law, which tends to be implemented
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bodies and give them real authority, they could do so without the insistence
of the state. As Eileen Appelbaum and her colleagues observe, "most
managers will only introduce changes in work organization that
fundamentally alter the balance of shop-floor power and allow workers to
share responsibility for making decisions as a matter of economic
necessity."' 1 6 (Moreover, management might well fear that unions would
aggressively seek to implement these mandatory employee committee laws,
for which bodies they could provide technical services and which could
become beach-heads for organization.) An additional question worth
exploring is whether it also can be in managements' economic interest to
give workers some of the participation they want.
B. Soft Law
The stark fact is that, absent effective legal compulsion, American
workers will not be heard in the workplace unless American managers want
to listen. The question is whether the state can devise means, possibly
coupled with mandated employee committees, to make it in managements'
interest to share information and seriously engage with independent
employee bodies in the absence of an exclusive bargaining agent. In the
area of occupational health and safety, for example, it has been proposed
that employee committees be linked to deregulation.'17 Pennsylvania, as
noted earlier, gives a discount on workers' compensation premiums for
employers with employee safety committees!"
Proceeding on the assumption that litigation will continue to grow, at
least some of the legal claims to be brought will require a determination of
the reasonableness vel non of an employer policy or an action taken
pursuant to it. This is clearest in the area of workplace privacy where
allegations of a violation may turn on whether or not an intrusion or a
disclosure infringed upon a "legitimate" expectation, or was offensive to a
"reasonable" person. In the cognate area of defamation, whether a
communication of information about an employee--the results of an
in larger workplaces where the effectiveness often depends on union support. Walther
Miiller-Jentsch, Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management, in WORKS CoUNcILS,
supra note 5, at 53, 56.
116. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 32, at 8. A student note sees the issue from the
employee perspective as a "classic collective action" problem, of free riding. Louise S.
Brock, Note, Overcoming Collective Action Problems: Enforcement of Worker Rights, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 810 (1997). But Freeman and Rogers conclude that there is an
adequate critical mass of workers willing to make such systems work. FREEMAN & ROGERS,
supra note 3, at 6-7.
117. PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERrrY 175-76 (1999) (citing David Levine,
Reinventing Workplace Regulation, 39 CAL. MGMT. REv. 98-117 (1997)); Richard B.
Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REv. 86, 108-09 (1986).
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1038.2 (West Supp. 2000).
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investigation of sexual harassment or other misconduct-is or is not
privileged may turn on the reasonableness of the scope of disclosure. So,
too, cases brought in contract-for breach of company policy contained in
an employee handbook or the like--may implicate the reasonableness of
the competing constructions offered by the parties. And in employment
discrimination law, the ability of an employer reasonably to accommodate
a disability or religious observance may implicate the interests of other
members of the work group.
It may pay to consider whether an express and uncoerced approval of
the policy or practice in question by the collectivity governed by it should
accord a level of judicial deference-a presumption of reasonableness.
Oddly, there is no texture to this proposition in the area of its most obvious
application: state lawsuits brought against employers on state claims that
implicate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. This is because
of the application of yet another and even more bewildering element of
federal preemption doctrine: section 301 preemption. 9 In essence, if a
state claim derives from or requires an interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement, the prevailing view is that the claim is completely
preempted; the plaintiffs sole recourse is through the grievance-arbitration
procedure of the collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, where the
collective agreement's provisions might speak to the reasonableness of the
challenged action, the courts have applied preemption, in effect, to
"extinguish" the state claim. 120 This doctrine may not make much sense in
terms of labor law,12 1 but one can discern in the interstices of that body of
law an approach that speaks to the issue of interest here. The Seventh
Circuit considered a case where an employee sought to enforce his
statutory right under state workers' compensation law to reinstatement to
119. As Richard Bales put it, "the section 301 preemption doctrine is an awful mess."
Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment
Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 702 (1997).
120. Id. at 719. See, e.g., Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th
Cir. 2000) (2-1 decision) (holding that a claim of invasion of privacy that arose from an
employer's videotaping of employee restrooms was preempted because the collective
agreement's treatment of the employer's power to videotape might have spoken to that
installation); Gore v. Trans World Airlines, 210 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir. 2000) (2-1 decision)
(holding that actions for invasion of privacy, negligence, false arrest, and defamation arising
from an employer's summary removal and causing the arrest of an employee were
preempted because the collective agreement might speak to the employer's standard of care
and responsibilities).
121. As Judge Posner opined, the more satisfying (if protracted) approach would require
the plaintiff first to exhaust the arbitration procedure provided by the collective agreement
rather than to extinguish the state claim. Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6
F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 1993). To similar effect, see Drummonds, supra note 82, at 594-
95; see also Laura W. Stein, Preserving Unionized Employees' Individual Employment
Rights: An Argument Against Section 301 Preemption, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1,
44-5 (1996).
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"suitable employment," which was also a matter partially addressed in the
operative collective bargaining agreement.122 The court held that the action
was not preempted. The state's workers' compensation law guarantees
suitable work to all employees:
What constitutes "suitable work" under the statute has its own
distinctive meaning, no matter how a collective bargaining
agreement is drafted. For a state law to have any force
whatsoever, its own legislature and courts must be the final
arbiters as to that law's interpretation. (Were this not true parties
could contractually redefine statutory language with idiosyncratic
meanings designed to subvert state law.) While a collective
bargaining agreement (along with the statute's plain meaning, a
state's policy, the industry's practice, environmental factors, or
some other indication) may lend assistance into a statutory
inquiry, such an inquiry would be limited in scope to interpreting
the statutory language without necessarily defining any term in
the collective bargaining agreement.z3
If the terms approved by the collectivity could "lend assistance into a
statutory inquiry,"1 24 akin to the very text of the law, it would seem to be of
equal assistance in deciding the reasonableness or legitimacy of the policy
challenged as a matter of common law as well. Such a presumption would
be accorded upon a showing of complete independence of action by the
employee committee in its selection and manner of operation (including not
only its ability to secure independent counsel or expert advice, but whether
it had done so) and that it was fairly representative of the group affected by
the policy.1 5 (The presumption would be rebuttable, for it is possible that
an employee committee could transgress the bounds of the permissible, just
as unions are held to a duty of fair representation in the contract terms they
negotiate. A further critical caution is added because these representatives,
unlike their union counterparts, are not protected against discharge without
good cause.)126 Conceivably, then, group agreement that tips would be
shared,127 that the piece-rate of pay would apply not per item packaged, but
122. Kohl's Food Stores, Inc. v. Hyland, 32 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994).
123. Id. at 1079.
124. Id.
125. This requirement was made express in the rules adopted under some of the
mandatory safety committee laws. E.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 31-40v-4(d) (1999)
(providing that "[r]easonable efforts shall be made to ensure that committee members are
representative of the major work activities at the work site"); Tenn. Div. of Workers'
Compensation R. 0800-2-3.06(4) (1999) (providing that "[r]easonable efforts shall be made
to ensure that committee members are representative of the daily work activities of the
employer").
126. Cf. Clyde Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structural Exception
to Section 8(a)(2), in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 47, at 126, 140
127. Cork v. Applebee's of Mich., Inc., 608 N.W.2d 62, 63 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
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per package packed,121 or even that participation in "pre-employment"
orientation would be uncompensated, n 9 could be considered in arguable
cases to evidence whether or not the employer breached its compensation
policies, or even whether or not it had breached the law;13 and, per contra,
non-concurrence would leave the matter judicially more open.13
This proposal is subject to at least two rather strong criticisms. First,
employers will set up "patsy" agreements which the courts will find
difficult to penetrate. Second, in view of the scant prospect that a court
would read an employer's policies to impose a stricter standard than the
employer claims, the employer is under no pressure to agree to a more
restrictive standard with a non-union employee committee than it would
otherwise unilaterally adopt. In sum, the effort to induce the creation of
independent employee bodies will either be manipulated or ignored.
The former criticism turns upon the aggressiveness of plaintiffs'
counsel on the issue of the collectivity's independence; here, the NLRB
could play an important role, for any person would be free to file a charge
of violation of section 8(a)(2) with the Board. The General Counsel's
declination to issue a complaint should be admissible as an indication of
want of either employer dominance or impermissible support. A Board
decision finding a section 8(a)(2) violation would also be dispositive
because the presumption would never come into play. The issuance of a
complaint by the General Counsel could be taken by a court as evidence
indicating the body's lack of independence. Here, section 8(a)(2) would
128. Evans v. Taylor Made Sandwich Co., 522 S.E.2d 350, 351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
129. Seattle Prof 1 Eng'g Employees Ass'n v. Boeing, 991 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Wash.
2000).
130. Lest this idea seem fanciful, a sidelong glance at corporate law might prove
instructive. Where shareholders believe that corporate directors are guilty of wrongdoing to
the corporation, they may bring an action against them on the corporation's behalf. In a
number of jurisdictions, however, the corporate defendant can free itself of the litigation if it
has been exonerated by a committee of the board (commonly called a "special litigation
committee") upon a judicial showing that the committee was independent of the alleged
wrongdoing (and wrongdoers) and had acted in good faith after a reasonable investigation.
See generally, Gregory V. Varallo et al., From Kahn to Carlton: Recent Developments in
Special Committee Practice, 53 Bus. LAW. 397 (1998). This has become a highly nuanced
area of law. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 984 P.2d 629, 637-38 (Colo. 1999)
(reviewing the law in several jurisdictions); In re PSE & G S'holder Litig., 718 A.2d 254,
256-60 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (reviewing the law in several jurisdictions). But for
purposes here it is enough to note that a corporate defendant is permitted to free itself of a
lawsuit merely by appointing a committee to review the allegations. See Lewis v. Fuqua,
502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985) (holding that the special litigation committee consisting
of a distinguished public figure may have lacked adequate independence such that
defendant's motion to dismiss cannot be granted). The independent directors presumably
adequately represent the corporate interests at stake.
131. See, e.g., Boustany v. Monsanto Co., 6 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)
(noting that the employee group did not agree with management's interpretation of its stock
option policy).
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work to assure at least a statutory minimum of independence.
The latter criticism is the more powerful, possibly compelling, of the
two. After all, state lawsuits may be totally precluded when an element of
the cause of action requires an interpretation of a collective agreement. Yet
even this near total legal insulation has not induced employers to be less
resistant to unionization. The question is whether, in the face of a much
more aggressive union litigation strategy, management will see it in its
interest to seek the legally safer harbor of employee concurrence as a
deterrent. Perhaps most employers will not find the benefit worth the
erosion of total control and, because unions could function as service
providers to these independent committees, not worth the additional risk
that employee participation may only wet their employees' appetite for
unionization; but, other employers might see these as risks worth taking. In
sum, there may well be little "upside" in this particular suggestion, but
there seems scant "downside" either.
V. CONCLUSION
Freeman and Rogers document what has come to be called "the
representation gap": the failure of the federal system to meet employees'
demand for an effective, independent voice in determining the policies that
will govern their workplace lives. What is to be done? Congress is
politically unable to bridge the gap, the states are legally constrained by
that very federal system in their ability fully to bridge it, and American
management, which has the ability to bridge it, won't.
According to Senator Lott (and others), America needs neither more
unionization nor more lawsuits, but it is unlikely to be had both ways: the
decline of one incites the rise of the other.132 Today, it may well be easier
to get a hundred thousand dollars for one worker (half the judgment going
to the plaintiff's lawyer and an additional sum from the employer to pay to
its own legal defense) than to get a nickel an hour raise for a hundred
workers; but if unionization will not fill this gap, litigation will, albeit
awkwardly and at a cost.
In this environment, there remains room still for state action within the
constraints of federal law partially to bridge the gap. The states can
identify specific areas where independent, employee-elected committees
might function in aid of state law, mandate their establishment and oversee
their operation. These might deal not only with occupational safety and
health, but with a variety of other issues: with work schedules, to use
Michael LeRoy's example, as speaking to the duty to accommodate family
132. Robert Pear, Elated by Antitrust Triumph, Doctors Take Case to Senate, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 1, 2000, at Al (quoting Trent Lott, U.S. Senate Majority Leader).
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leave, religious observance or physical or mental disability; with workplace
privacy, in aid of specific legislation and the common law; with standards
and procedures for dismissal, in aid of the law of employment
discrimination, whistleblowing and wrongful or retaliatory discharge; even
with wages and benefits, as implicated by state wage and hour and wage
payment law. The states might consider as well according a legal safe
harbor for the policies concurred in by such bodies, insofar as they clarify
vague or ambiguous statutory or common law protections, as an incentive
for managerial cooperation. In other words, the more juridified world of
work in the twenty-first century holds open the possibility, however
remote, of redirecting some responsibility away from the courts and into
the workplace, of giving American workers some of what they want.
